Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a Commitment Device by Boukouras, Aristotelis
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a
Commitment Device
Citation for published version:
Boukouras, A 2013 'Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a Commitment Device'.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Preprint (usually an early version)
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Boukouras, A. (2013). Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a Commitment Device.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
Separation of Ownership and Control:
Delegation as a Commitment Device
Aristotelis Boukouras∗
May 17, 2013
Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of owner-
ship and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker for providing effort
to complete a project. The worker’s effort determines the probability that the
project is completed on time, but the worker receives unobservable benefits for
every period she is employed. We show that hiring a manager on a short-term
contract may increase the firm value and we identify the conditions under which
separation of ownership and control is optimal. The model is consistent with
empirical findings.
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1 Introduction
Separation of ownership from control has generated a long literature in economics and
finance. The first contributions go back to Berle and Means (1932) and even Adam
Smith (1776). The stylized fact of this literature is the large corporation, which is owned
by many small stockholders but is run centrally by professional managers, who have a
negligible fraction of total ownership. The associated agency costs and the corporate
mechanisms to combat them have been the central focus of the early literature on this
topic1.
Despite being challenged by recent empirical analyses2, this stylized fact still reflects
the situation for a substantial fraction of large corporations3. There are mainly two
arguments provided for explaining the separation of ownership and control: (i) Share-
holders do not have the ability, expertise or the knowledge to run firms, while managers
do. (ii) The opportunity cost of time for large shareholders is high, namely they prefer
leisure or starting a new company than dealing with management issues. Though per-
fectly valid, these arguments do not relate the firms’ observable characteristics to their
control structure, implying that the former are unrelated to the latter. However, this
is not the case (see for example Demsetz and Lehn (1985)).
This paper proposes an alternative theoretical explanation on why investors may
prefer to separate ownership from control and relates firm characteristics to the opti-
mal choice of control structure. The main argument is that managers are “tougher” on
workers than entrepreneurs, exactly because they may not have a large stake on its long-
run prospects. Since a manager’s payoff depends mainly on the short run returns of the
1See Monsen and Downs (1965), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama
(1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
2See Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Holderness (2009)
3For example, Mikkelson and Partch (1989) finds that the top three officials own less than 10
percent of the stock combined for 60 percent of the companies. Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan
(1999) find that the average stock-holdings of a CEO is 1.25 percent (the median is only 0.06). Jensen
and Murphy (1990) report similar findings.
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firm, this makes her more likely to terminate currently unprofitable projects, even if they
have positive long run NPV. Though this generates agency costs, it forces employees
to work harder in order to avoid project terminations. Our setup is broadly consistent
with empirical papers on management, which show that entrepreneurs care more about
the long-run prospects of their firms and tend to foster long-term relationships with
customers and employees (see for example Pruitt (1999), Miller and Le Breton-Miller
(2005), James (2006), Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, and Very (2007), Gomez-Mejia, Haynes,
Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, and Moyano-Fuentes (2007), Miller, Breton-Miller, and Schol-
nick (2008) for studies on family-owned firms).
In order to make this argument as clear and stark as possible, a simple two-period
model with one entrepreneur and one worker is presented in section two of the paper.
The entrepreneur is assumed to have full ownership and control over the firm and is
not financially constrained4. She also owns a project, which may take two or three time
periods to complete, and which increases the firm’s profits once it is completed. The
worker exerts non-verifiable effort, which increases the probability that the project is
completed at the end of period two, but she receives an unobservable private benefit
for every period she is employed in the project before its completion. As a result, the
entrepreneur needs to compensate the worker for the loss of the private benefit, if she
wants the project to complete sooner.
It is shown that, if the entrepreneur could commit to liquidate the project, then the
worker would exert high effort at a lower wage. However, this threat is not credible,
because the continuation value of the project is higher than the liquidation value. In
fact, if the worker is sufficiently risk averse, the entrepreneur may prefer to provide
4In fact, it is irrelevant for our purposes if the firm has only one or many owners. We consider the
case of an entrepreneur because it is the simplest possible and it allows us to distinguish the importance
of the control structure (owners versus managers) from that of the ownership structure (large versus
small shareholders). For the latter case, see the papers by Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and
Vishny (1986), Grossman and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988), Bebchuk (1994), Burkart, Gromb,
and Panunzi (1997) and Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998).
3
no incentives for high effort. This problem is solved by hiring a manager and giving
her a payment conditional only on period-two profits. This induces her to liquidate the
project if it is delayed. The entrepreneur’s time-inconsistency problem is solved and the
worker exerts effort for a fixed payment. Thus, delegation of control strictly increases
the owner’s payoff.
The model is extended in section 3 with the addition of a moral hazard problem from
the manager’s side. This allows us to study the more plausible case, where giving up
control to the manager may generate undesirable consequences (i.e. agency costs). We
provide the optimal managerial contract and we examine the conditions under which
separation of ownership and control is optimal.
The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First, the optimal managerial
contract in our setting is a short-term contract which gives the manager a con-
stant fraction of profits. Even though we do not intend to provide a general theory
of optimal contract duration, this result goes against the current theoretical literature
on the optimality of long-term contracts over short-term (Shavell (1979), Laffont and
Tirole (1988)), or the equivalence between the two classes (Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and
Milgrom (1990))5. The main intuition behind it is that the time-inconsistency problem
of the entrepreneur, the fact that she does not want to liquidate a delayed project, is
solved by the provision of myopic incentives to the manager (no remuneration after
period two). Moreover, since the release of control to the manager generates agency
costs (profit appropriation), it is optimal to reduce the duration of her employment in
the firm, which makes a short-term contract optimal.
Second, we provide a theoretical model for the separation of ownership and control
which is consistent with empirical findings. That is, in our model, separation of owner-
ship and control is: (i) positively correlated with project size, (ii) negatively correlated
5See also (Thadden, 1995).
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with profit variability, and (iii) positively correlated with firm age. These predictions
are consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Claessens, Djankov,
and Lang (2000). One prediction of the model, that has not been tested empirically
yet is that manager-controlled firms induce workers to exert more effort or exert effort
more cheaply than entrepreneurial firms.
The interpretation of the worker’s private benefits is important in our model. In the
relevant literature they are often interpreted as the unobservable part of output, which
is appropriated by the worker (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Pagano and Volpin
(2006)). In our case, they are better interpreted as any perk or benefit of employment,
which can not be included in the wage contract, because it is unobservable or non-
verifiable, and which is not offered by the worker’s next-best employment opportunity.
This could be due to the firm’s geographical position (proximity to residence), social
networks within the organization (friendly working environment, similarly minded col-
leagues), reputation or career effects (organizational prestige and reputation), or any
other factor.
What is crucial for our argument to go through is that the level of private benefits
is not controlled by the firm’s decision maker. Also, these benefits may either be
unobservable, so that they are not compensated by the wage offer, or the wage may
be set before the choice of employee is made (as in the case of blue collar workers).
Moreover, since most employees apply to similarly paid jobs and usually have more
than one job offer, it is plausible that the employee’s decision is made on the grounds
of these benefits.
The are several strands of literature related to our own. First, models of separation
of ownership and control are provided by other papers. The early literature (Jensen
and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Demsetz (1983))
recognized the existence of agency costs in the firm and examined how the ownership
5
and control structure is used in order to combat them. But they did not explain why
the decision power had to be delegated to managers in the first place.
More recently, Acemoglu (1998) explains the separation of ownership and control as
a signal of the entrepreneur to financial markets about the quality of her project. Our
paper does not relate the presence of managers to financial markets but to the internal
workings of the firm. Manager’s role is also different: they are not used as signaling
devices but as a commitment devices.
Ferreira, Ornelas, and Turner (2010), based on Ornelas and Turner (2007), examine
the separation of ownership and control in a model of optimal dissolution of partnership.
Two partners allocate ex-ante and ex-post ownership rights in order to optimize ex-post
incentives in revealing their type and allocating optimal control rights. Thus, their
model is one of shareholders reaching an agreement on who should run the firm, while
this paper adopts the principal-agent framework. Moreover, the main friction in their
model is one of hidden types, while in this paper it is one of hidden actions.
Our explanation of separation of ownership and control is based on strategic del-
egation(Schelling (1980), Katz (1991), Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Bensaid and
Gary-Bobo (1993), Bester and Sakovics (2001), Gerratana and Koc¸kesen (2012)). This
literature examines how principals delegate their actions to agents as a form of strategic
precommitment (see for example Sklivas (1987), Caillaud, Jullien, and Picard (1995),
Bond and Gresik (2011)). However, in these papers, the focus is on how delegation
can be used to improve the bargaining power of the principal when competing against
other principals (for example in a Cournot game of duopoly as in Sklivas (1987) or as
in Zhang and Zhang (1997), Kopel and Riegler (2006), Kopel and Riegler (2008) or
as in Jansen, van Lier, and van Witteloostuijn (2007)). While, in our paper strategic
delegation is used in order to increase the bargaining power of the principal within the
firm itself and make her “tougher” against workers. As a result, the duration of the
6
contract with the agent matters in our setting, a dimension which is absent from the
present strategic-delegation literature. Moreover, an issue that often arises in these
papers (and it also appears in ours) is the renegotiation-proofness of the principal’s
original agreement with the agent. We examine conditions under which the possibility
of renegotiation does not destroy the commitment effects of delegation in section 4.1.
Our paper can also be categorized in the soft-budget-constraint literature (Dewa-
tripont and Maskin (1995), Dewatripont and Roland (2000) and Kornai, Maskin, and
Roland (2003)). In effect, the entrepreneur in our model faces a soft-budget constraint:
if the project is delayed she does not want to liquidate it, even thought this is optimal
ex-ante. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) propose decentralization as the solution to
soft-budget-constraint problems, while we propose delegation as an alternative solution.
Issues of time-inconsistency and commitment have been examined in many other
contexts, most notably in public policy (Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gor-
don (1983)). Similarly to us, Rogoff (1985) considers delegation to an agent with a
different objective function than the principal as a solution to these problems. The
main difference between his paper and ours is that in Rogoff (1985) this difference is
exogenous: the agents has intrinsically different preferences from the principal. In our
paper the difference in objectives arises endogenously: it is through the managerial
contract, which provides, by construction, myopic incentives to the manager, that the
principal aligns her ex-post objectives to the ex-ante.
More generally, the paper is related to the theoretical literature regarding delegation.
This literature focuses on how to design the action-set of the agent optimally, but takes
delegation of decision power as given. Examples of this literature are Holmstrom (1984),
Faure-Grimaud, Laffont, and Martimort (2003) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008). As
we noted before, delegation of decision power is endogenously determined in our model.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on deadlines, which examine how
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deadlines are used in order to mitigate dynamic moral hazard problems. Examples of
this literature are the papers by Toxvaerd (2006), Toxvaerd (2007), Mason and Valimaki
(2008), Bonatti and Horner (2011). The main difference is that deadlines mitigate free-
riding problems within a team, while we deal with a time-inconsistency problem.
To summarize, we believe that the main contributions of this paper are the follow-
ing: (i) It shows how the separation of ownership and control can act as a commitment
device, which increases workers’ effort and generates firm value. (ii) The optimal man-
agerial contract is a short-term contract, which provides myopic incentives. (iii) The
trade-off between optimal worker effort and agency costs relates firm-characteristics to
the optimal choice of control structure and generates empirical predictions, which are
consistent with the existing literature.
2 A Simple Model
There are four time periods: t = {0, 1, 2, 3} and two agents: the entrepreneur (E) and
the worker (W). E is risk neutral. W’s utility is quasi-linear: UW = u(w)− c(e), where
u(x) is a concave function: u′ > 0 , u′′ < 0 , w is W’s wage in monetary terms and
c(e) is the cost of effort. Effort is unobservable and there are two effort levels: High (e)
and Low (e), with corresponding effort costs c and c.
E owns a firm which generates profits ρt at the end of periods two and three
6. ρt is
a random variable, normally and independently distributed in each period, with mean
τ and variance σ2: ρt ∼ N(τ, σ2). E can increase the firm’s average profits (τ) by hiring
W at t = 0 in order to complete a project. After signing the contract, W exerts effort,
which takes place also at (or just after) t = 0. The chosen effort level determines the
probability that the project will be completed on time.
6For simplicity we assume that the firm generates no profit at t = 1. Even though our mathematical
expressions become more complicated, none of our results changes if we relax this assumption.
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If W exerts high effort then the project is completed on-time (state o) at t = 2
with probability p and it is delayed (completed at t = 3: state d) with probability
1− p. If the projected is completed on-time, then it generates additional profits Vo for
the firm in periods two and three. In other words, for every realization of ρt, firms’
profits are ρt+Vo, implying that expected profits increase to τ +Vo in each period. The
delayed project does not yield any additional profits in period two (Vd2 = 0) and yields
additional profits only in period three: Vd3 = Vd. Similarly, if W exerts low effort the
project is completed on time with probability p and is delayed with probability 1− p.
We assume that the project is more valuable if it is completed on-time (2Vo > Vd >
0) and that exerting high effort is efficient: p > p , c > c , ∆p(2Vo−Vd) > ∆c , where
∆p = p− p and ∆c = c− c.
At t = 1 E finds out whether the project will be delayed or not. Then, she can
choose either to liquidate the project (L = 1) and forgo Vd or to let the project continue
(L = 0). If E liquidates the project, then profits increase by Vl at t = 2 and remain
unchanged at t = 3 (Vl2 = Vl , Vl3 = 0). This implies that the expected profits of
the firm after liquidation are τ + Vl and τ for periods two and three respectively. We
assume that Vd > Vl > 0. The liquidation value of the project can be interpreted as
either the value that other firms are willing to pay in order to undertake the project or
the scrap value for the assets invested in it. In either case, what is important is that
the project generates positive synergies in E’s firm, so that letting the project complete
with delay generates more profits than liquidating it.
Whether the project is delayed or not is private information to the relevant decision
maker at time t = 1 (E in this case) and is non-verifiable. The project’s current status
and its completion date are also non-verifiable. Moreover, E can not impose financial
penalties to W (W is employed under limited-liability), so the wage contract w satisfies
w ≥ 0. These assumptions imply that E can not provide an incentive contract which
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is conditional on the project’s completion date or status. And because W is risk-averse
with respect to the wage, providing incentives through the wage can be very costly.
However, the liquidation decision may have an incentive effect, if W enjoys private
benefits from being employed in the firm. More specifically, let us assume that for every
period that W is employed in E’s firm, she receives additional utility equal to b, which
we call private benefit. b enters W ’s utility linearly: UW = u(w) + b− c(e).
The usual interpretation of this term in the literature is the unobservable part of
output, which is appropriated by W (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Pagano and
Volpin (2006)). Here it is better interpreted as any perk or benefit of her employment,
which can not be included in the wage contract, because it is unobservable or non-
verifiable, and which is not offered by W’s next-best employment opportunity. This
effect maybe due to the geographical position of the firm, its proximity to her residence,
the friendly working environment or the good relations with her colleagues, the esteem
that she enjoys from working in a reputable firm or any other factor that is firm-specific.
The important assumptions are that b accrues over time and that E does not control
it directly.
Overall, the above assumptions allow us to capture a complex working environment
in a simple way, where it is impossible or very costly to disentangle the state of the
project from the normal operations of the firm and where it is very difficult to motivate
the worker based on state-contingent contracts7. Even the utility that W receives from
being employed is not fully controlled by E, due to the unobservable benefits b. The
figure below presents the timing of events so far.
Let us examine the value of the liquidation decision in this set-up. Since W’s
effort level, the project’s status and E’s liquidation decision are unobservable and non-
7Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show how simple linear contracts can be optimal if there are
several dimensions of unobservability. Even though our environment is more specific than theirs, we
get a result of similar flavor: complex contracts can not do better than simple flat-rate contracts.
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verifiable, the wage contract can be made contingent only on the realized level of profit
and on the time periods: w(piwt , t). In terms of notation, if pi
w
t are the (verifiable) profits,
upon which the wage contract can be made contingent, Ls is the liquidation decision
in state s (s = {o, d}), Vst is the non-liquidated project’s value in state s and period t,
and Vlt is the liquidated project’s value in period t, then pi
w
t = ρt + (1−Ls)Vst +LsVlt8.
Hence, piwt is a random variable, normally distributed with mean τ + (1− Ls)Vst +
LsVlt. Let f(pi
w
t |µ) denote the density function of piwt conditional on its mean µ. Then,
if the project is completed on time, µo = τ+Vo in both periods, if the project is delayed
µd2 = τ , µd3 = τ + Vd, and if the project is liquidated µl2 = τ + Vl, µl3 = τ . Therefore,
W’s expected utility is equal to:
Epiw(Uw) = p(e)
{
b+ (1− Lo)
[
b+
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw2 , 2))f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2
]}
+(1−p(e))
b+ (1− Ld)
2b+ +∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw2 , 2))f(pi
w
2 |µ2d)dpiw2 +
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw3 , 3))f(pi
w
3 |µ3d)dpiw3
−c(e)
(1)
The first term on the right-hand-side is the expected utility of the project completing
8Also recall that Vo2 = Vo3 = Vo , Vd2 = 0 , Vd3 = Vd , Vl2 = Vl , Vl3 = 0.
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on-time. Then W receives the private benefit of the first period plus the benefit and
the wage of the second period, conditional on no-liquidation. Equivalently, the second
term is the expected utility of the delayed project. Since delay implies that the worker
stays with the firm until t = 3 (conditional on no-liquidation), W receives the private
benefit of the first period plus the wages and benefits of periods two and three9.
If E does not liquidate the project in the case of delay (Lo = Ld = 0), then, for
inducing high effort, she needs to provide the wage schedule wˆ with (see the appendix
for details):
wˆ(piw2 , 2) = (u
′)−1
[
pf(piw2 |µo) + (1− p)f(piw2 |τ)
λ[f(piw2 |µo)− f(piw2 |τ)]
]
wˆ(piw3 , 3) = 0
Moreover, if W is sufficiently risk-averse, the cost of inducing high effort may exceed
the value of on-time completion. Then E would prefer to provide no wage to the worker
and induce an increase in the probability of delay. This is the case when Epiw2 (wˆ2) ≥
∆p(2Vo − Vd). If, however, E liquidates after she finds out that the project is delayed,
then she can induce high effort by paying (see the appendix for details):
w2 = u
−1 [max{0, (∆c/∆p)− b}]
One can show (see the appendix) that E’s expected payment to induce high effort
is lower in the latter case (when she liquidates). Moreover, it takes a higher degree
of risk-aversion for the expected payment to exceed the value of on-time completion.
Therefore, liquidation can be valuable to E either by reducing the cost of inducing high
9Hence, we assume that W is fired with no wage and no compensation if the project is liquidated.
If the project is not liquidated, W remains in the firm until the project is completed and receives the
wage and the benefits of the corresponding periods.
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effort or by making high effort profitable.
However, it is not a credible threat. Because the continuation value of the project
is strictly greater than the liquidation value (Vd > Vl), it is not a best-response for
E to liquidate the project after delay. Since W anticipates that, exerting high effort
is impossible. In other words, E suffers from a time-inconsistency problem, which is
essentially a soft-budget constraint 10. How can she deal with it? The solution is to
hire a manager under a contract which provides a payment conditional on short-run
(period-one) profits.
To see this, suppose that E can not impose financial penalties to M (the manager),
and consider the following simple contract. M is hired to control the firm for period one
only, i.e. M is given the authority to determine L at time t = 1, and her reward y2 is
a linear function of the period two profits: y2 = pi
m
2 , where pi
m
2 = Epiw2 {piw2 − w(piw2 , 2)}
and 2 is a small, positive constant. Under this contract, M prefers to let the project
continue if there is no delay, since Vo > Vd, while she prefers to liquidate it if the delay
occurs (Vl > 0). This solves the time-inconsistency problem of the entrepreneur and
allows her to complete the project on time.
The main intuition is that the manager does not suffer from the time-inconsistency
problem that the entrepreneur faces, because her payoff is constructed through the
contract and does not depend on the primitives of the economy. As a result, the
delegation of control to the manager can relax the incentive compatibility of the worker
and this increases the entrepreneur’s payoff. In other words, the separation of ownership
and control is optimal from the entrepreneur’s point of view in this economy11.
10See the papers by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Dewatripont and Roland (2000) and Kornai,
Maskin, and Roland (2003).
11Note that the simple contract proposed in this sub-section is not renegotiation-proof. We return
to this issue in subsection 4.
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3 A Model with Managerial Moral Hazard
3.1 The Manager
In this section we allow for more general results by including a moral hazard problem
from the manager’s side. Thus the rents earned by the manager reduce the value of
delegation for the entrepreneur and generate a trade-off between worker incentives and
control incentives.
In order to make this point, we consider an extreme form of moral hazard, where the
manager can appropriate part of profits, before any wages are paid, and transform them
into private benefits or non-pecuniary rewards at an exogenously given and constant
return factor q, with 0 < q < 1. That is, for every single unit of profit that the manager
appropriates, proportion q is transformed into utility for the manager and proportion
1− q is lost as appropriation cost.
As before, there are four periods, t = {0, 1, 2, 3}. The entrepreneur E and the
Manager M are risk neutral, but the worker W is risk-averse with respect to the wage
(we assume the same quasi-linear utility as in section 2). The discount factor is one for
all agents and the firm is owned in its entirety in the beginning of period zero by E.
Both W and M are protected by limited liability (non-negative rewards).
E decides at t = 0 if she runs the firm or if she delegates control to M. ρt is the
random stream of profits in periods two and three (ρt ∼ N(τ, σ2)) and W’s effort (e)
determines the probability that the project is completed on-time. All the variables with
respect to the project (e, p(e), c(e), Vst, Vlt, Ls) and their interaction remain as in section
2.
The new element is that M, after observing the “internal” profits pimt = ρt + (1 −
Ls)Vst +LsVlt (profits before wages), decides to appropriate a part of them (rt(pi
m
t )). A
fraction q of appropriated profits becomes managerial utility, while the remaining (1−
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q)rt(pi
m
t ) becomes deadweight-loss for the firm. Because the projects status, its returns
and profit appropriation are observable only by the decision maker in the firm (M in the
case of delegation), only the profits after appropriation are verifiable: piwt = pi
m
t −rt(pim).
This implies that the wage contract is contingent on profits after appropriation and on
time periods: w(piwt , t), while the managerial contract and entrepreneurial returns are
contingent on profits after wages: piet = pi
w
t − w(piwt , t) (after wages profits), yt(piet )
(managerial contract/reward in period t), ue = pi
e
t − yt(piet ) (entrepreneurial returns).
Overall, the following list of profits clarifies the different definitions and assumptions.
• before appropriation profits: pimt = ρt+(1−Ls)Vst+LsVlt (unobservable/non-
verifiable)
• after appropriation profits: piwt = ρt + (1−Ls)Vst +LsVlt− rt(pimt ) (verifiable)
• after wages profits: piet = ρt+(1−Ls)Vst+LsVlt−rt(pimt )−w(piwt , t) (verifiable)
We also assume that E can choose the managerial contract’s duration (δ). That
is, E may hire M for only the first period (δ = 1), after which M is fired (i.e. she
receives no future payments by E) and E resumes control of the company. We call this
the short-term contract. Or E may hire M for both periods (δ = 2), which we call
the long-term contract. Overall, the managerial reward is determined by profits after
wages and duration: {yt(piet |δ)}.
The timing of events is as follows. At t = 0 E hires W under the contract w(piwt , t)
and decides whether to delegate control to M or not and for how long by offering
the contract {yt(piet |δ)} to M. At t = 1, the firm’s decision maker (either E or M,
depending on the delegation decision) decides whether to liquidate the project or not
(after having observed whether there is a delay of the project or not). Firm’s profits
and agents’ payoffs are then realized at periods t = {2, 3}. The figure below shows this
timing.
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3.2 Optimal Managerial Contract
We first examine the case where E decides to delegate control to M and we determine
the optimal managerial contract. The optimal contract is the solution to the following
problem:
max
y1(pie1|δ),y2(pie2|δ),δ

1∑
s=0
ps(ew)
 3∑
t=2
+∞∫
−∞
(piet − yt(piet |δ))f(piet |µt)dpiet
 (2)
subject to:
{rt(pimt ), L} = argmax

1∑
s=0
ps(ew)
 3∑
t=2
+∞∫
−∞
(yt(pi
e
t |δ) + qrt(pimt ))f(pimt |µt)dpimt
 (3)
Since the only potential benefit from delegating control to M is reducing the wage
that induces W to exert high effort, we examine only the optimal managerial contract
which induces M to liquidate the project under delay. We implicitly assume that E
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provides the corresponding contract w to W, which was defined in section 212. Any
other incentives for M can not generate more value to E than the value E receives by
retaining control of the firm.
Thus, problem (2)-(3) is equivalent to maximizing equation (2) under three incen-
tive compatibility conditions: (i) In the end of each period M should be indifferent
between appropriating part of the profits or not. (ii)-(iii) After M is informed whether
the project is completed on time or not, she should liquidate the project, if it is delayed,
and she should not liquidate it otherwise. Given the above incentive compatibility con-
ditions, Proposition 1 presents the optimal managerial contract. The proof is provided
in the appendix.
Proposition 1 The optimal managerial contract is a short-term linear contract
with payment y∗1(pi
e
1|δ = 1) = qpie1, if profits are positive and zero otherwise.
We leave the comparative statics for the next subsection and we make a few notes on
the form and interpretation of the managerial contract. The managerial contract is
similar to a call option with exercise price zero. This is because it makes no payment
to the manager, if profits are negative, and starts to pay-out when profits are positive.
Moreover, the manager receives a constant proportion of the profits. The first part of
the managerial contract is a direct implication of limited liability, while the second part
is due to the ability of the manager to divert profits into private benefits.
More interestingly, the optimal managerial contract is a short-term contract. This is
due to the interplay of two forces: the time-inconsistency problem of the entrepreneur,
whose solution requires “myopic” (front-loaded) incentives, and the agency-costs born
12It is easy to show that, conditional on M liquidating the project under delay, w is the optimal
wage.
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by the release of control. In the absence of the time-inconsistency problem E would
not hire M (“zero” contract duration), while in the absence of profit appropriation,
the optimal short-term and long-term contracts would be equivalent. Admittedly, our
setup does not provide a general framework for analyzing optimal contract duration.
Nonetheless, it does provide an example where short-term contracts dominate long-term
contracts, a result that is not present in the current literature.
3.3 Optimal Control Structure and Comparative Statics
We now examine the value of the firm under the two ownership structures and the
conditions under which the entrepreneur prefers to separate ownership from control. In
the analysis that follows we consider the more interesting case, where W is sufficiently
risk averse, so that E prefers to induce low effort, if she retains control. Thus, we can
contrast the costs and benefits of the two ownership structures in terms of efficient
provision of incentives for the worker versus managerial rents. This assumption also
gives the more plausible result, that the worker’s wage is independent of profits.
Therefore, if E retains the control of the firm at t = 0, she pays the minimum wage
to the worker (in our model this is w = 0), she continues the project, even if it delayed,
and the firm’s expected value (V E) is equal to:
V E = 2τ + p2Vo + (1− p)Vd
On the other hand, if E separates ownership from control, then E provides the efficiency
wage w to W and the contract of Proposition 1 to M at t = 0. At t = 1, M liquidates
the project only if it is delayed. Then the firm’s expected value (V M) to E is equal to:
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V M = 2τ − w + p
2Vo − q +∞∫
0
pie2f(pi
e
2|µeo)dpie2
+ (1− p)
Vl − q +∞∫
0
pie2f(pi
e
2|µel)dpie2

where: µeo = τ + Vo − w and µel = τ + Vl − w. By directly comparing V E to V M , we
see that E prefers to separate ownership from control iff:
2Vo∆p ≥ (1− p)Vd − (1− p)Vl + w + E(y2(pie2)) (4)
where E(y2(pi
e
2)) is the expected payment to the manager:
E(y2(pi
e
2)) = q
p +∞∫
0
pie2f(pi
e
2|µeo)dpie2 + (1− p)
+∞∫
0
pie2f(pi
e
2|µel)dpie2

Therefore, E separates ownership and control whenever the increase in the value of
the project through the higher probability of completion on-time exceeds the efficiency
wage to W and the expected value of rents to M. The comparative statics of equation
4 are summarized in the following corollary of Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 The entrepreneur is more likely to separate ownership from control if 13:
• The ability of the manager to appropriate profits (q) decreases.
• The value of the completed project increases (Vo).
13Here, the term “likely” refers to whether the set of parameters that satisfy equation 4 increases
or not as one of them changes. One can justify this term by imagining that there is a probability
distribution over the set of parameters value, which provides the percentage of firms with the same
characteristics and which gives the total probability of a firm belonging to one control structure or the
other, as evaluated by the cumulative distribution conditional on equation (4). The mental exercise
is, therefore, to examine what happens to this probability, conditioning on a small change around a
specific value of one parameter. A similar interpretation is given by Tirole (2001).
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• The differential impact of effort on incentives (∆p) increases, by increasing the left-hand
side of (4) and by decreasing w.
• The efficiency wage w decreases, either because ∆p or b increases or because ∆c de-
creases.
• The variance of the firm profits (σ2) increases.
The interpretation of most of these comparative statics is straightforward. We briefly
discuss the most interesting implications.
3.3.1 Optimal control structure and profit variability
An increase in the variance of profits (σ2) increases the expected payment to the man-
ager, E[y2(pi
e
2)], and decreases the value of separation of ownership and control. This
is because an increase in σ2 makes high-profit states more likely. Since the managerial
reward is an increasing function of profits, so as to prevent rent extraction, higher vari-
ance increases the expected reward of the manager and, hence, the expected cost for
the entrepreneur. This model prediction is also consistent with the empirical studies
on this topic (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
3.3.2 Optimal control structure and firm size
An important empirical finding in the literature is that separation of ownership and
control is positively correlated with firm size (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000),
Faccio and Lang (2002)). The model is consistent with this finding if we consider an
increase in the value of the project. This is because, if the value of the project increases
in both states (so that dVo = dVd = dv), the increase in the value of the completed
project contributes in both periods (t = 2 and t = 3) while the increase in the value of
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the delayed project contributes only in period t = 3. Hence, condition (4) becomes less
restrictive which means that firms of larger size (in terms of project value) are more
likely to separate ownership from control.
The opposite holds if the increase in the firm size is due to an increase in the mean
value of the stream of random profits τ . In this case, the expected managerial reward
increases, causing the right-hand side of (4) to increase. Hence, separation of ownership
and control becomes less likely14.
Also note that, in terms of prediction, our model can be distinguished from simpler
theories which relate firm size to the separation of ownership and control. For example,
if firms separate ownership from control simply because they need funds to grow, then
one would expect that the largest shareholders/blockholders of the firm are also its
managers. This is because the moral hazard of running the firm is mitigated by retaining
a higher fraction of ownership. In our model this means that (IC1) (page 30 of the
appendix) is relaxed as the manager holds more equity. However, this prediction is
not consistent with empirical findings (see Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Holderness,
Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999)). On the contrary our model is consistent with managers
not being the largest blockholder of their firms and, in fact, not having a stake in the
ownership of the firm at all.
3.3.3 Optimal control structure and firm age
Another empirical finding is that separation of ownership and control is positively cor-
related with firm age (Demsetz and Lehn (1985),Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000)).
The model can be made consistent with this finding as well, if firm owners acquire
better monitoring abilities over time. This could be because, through the accumulation
14In an earlier version of the paper we showed that an increase in the number of projects implies
that separation of ownership and control is more likely. The argument is very similar to the argument
used for the increase in project profitability.
21
of experience over time, the owner understands better how the firm is run and this re-
duces the managements ability to appropriate profits. Then q goes down with firm age
and the expected value of separation of ownership and control increases for older firms.
Therefore, we should expect a positive correlation between firm age and separation of
ownership and control, as it is confirmed by empirical studies.
4 Discussion
There are some theoretical issues of the model of the previous section, which we have
left for discussion in this section for the interested reader. We discuss each one in turn
in order to demonstrate that our model is robust to certain theoretical concerns.
4.1 Renegotiation-Proofness
In the models of sections 2 and 3 we showed that separation of ownership and control
is a solution to the entrepreneur’s problem. However, this solution is not renegotiation-
proof. This is because, after the manager finds out that the project is delayed, she can
contact the entrepreneur and ask for a contract renegotiation or for a fixed payment in
order to give back the control of the firm to the entrepreneur. This makes the solution
non-credible and destroys the incentives of the worker to exert high effort.
As previous papers have shown (see Dewatripont (1988), Fudenberg and Tirole
(1990), Ma (1991)), the problem of renegotiation-proofness can be overcome by intro-
ducing additional frictions in the model. Even though we kept the model simple and
tractable so far, one can easily examine extensions of the model in section 3 which
include adverse selection with regards to the project quality. For example, suppose
that at the time of contracting (t = 0), the project quality is unknown to both E and
M. With probability φ the project will turn out to be of high quality, yielding returns
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V Ho , V
H
d and V
H
l in the respective states, and with probability 1 − φ will be of low
quality, yielding V Lo , V
L
d and V
L
l . In general V
H
s > V
L
s .
Now assume that at time t = 1 M learns not only whether the project is delayed
but also its quality, so that renegotiation takes place under asymmetric information on
the value of the project. Then one can show (formal arguments are presented in the
appendix) that the entrepreneur has to pay both types of managers the continuation
value of the “high”-manager contract in order to convince them to renegotiate. But,
if the additional cost for the entrepreneur from overpaying the “low”-type manager
exceeds the value of renegotiation, then E prefers not to renegotiate at the high-type’s
continuation value. Hence renegotiation with high-type managers is impossible and
delegation is still valuable if the ratio of high-to-low types is not too low (see the
appendix)15.
4.2 Optimality of the Mechanism
We now consider two alternative solutions to the problem we have presented in the pre-
vious sections. We also discuss under what conditions they are preferred to delegation
or not. The first one is a governmental policy, which taxes away all profits of the firm
in period two. The second one is issuing claims on the profits of the firm to financial
markets.
As far the the first one is concerned, taxing away the profits of period two destroys
the continuation value of the project and makes the threat of liquidation credible. This
is because, as soon as E finds out that the project is delayed, she prefers to sell it.
The result is the same as delegating decision power to the manager: E can reduce the
15The same argument can be made with a continuum of types. In this case, if the adverse selection
problem is severe, the entrepreneur would not renegotiate the contract for any manager type, apart the
lowest possible, leading to a complete collapse of the renegotiation process and the ex-ante optimality
of delegation. The formal treatment of this argument is available by the author upon request.
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efficiency wage of the worker and increase her payoff.
However, the policy is not costless for the entrepreneur. Since the continuation of
the project increases average profits for the firm in period two, the governmental policy
can solve the time inconsistency problem of E only if it taxes away all of the profits of
the firm in this period. Therefore, the expected cost of the policy is equal to τ . Hence,
taxing away profits is a better mechanism than delegation only if the expected profit of
the firm in period two (excluding the project value) is less than the expected payment
of the manager. Otherwise, separation of ownership and control remains an optimal
solution.
The second solution is more interesting. The entrepreneur can issue financial claims
on the future stream of profits of the firm in the beginning of period one and sell them
to financial markets. One such financial claim is for instance a claim on all profits of
period two, which can be sold for a price equal to τ . Another potential claim is the
one which replicates the state-contingent payoff of the entrepreneur in period two when
delegation is used, which is sold for a price equal to V M 16.
Both of these claims work equally well. The first one replicates the effects of the
governmental policy, discussed above, while the second one replicates the incentives
provided by the managerial contract. Moreover, both of them have the additional
benefit that the entrepreneur retains the value of the claims she is selling by receiving
the price. Indeed, for the models of section 2 and 3, selling financial claims is a costless
way for the entrepreneur to commit not to continue the project, if a delay occurs. In
other words, delegation is useless in terms of our model, if well functioning financial
markets are available.
The main issue, however, with this solution is that financial markets usually suffer
from adverse selection. While we have avoided to complicate the model for the sake
16It is essentially the financial claim which promises the payment pie2 − y2(pie2) when the firm profit
is pie2 and where y2(pi
e
2) is provided by equation 7 in the Appendix.
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of expositional clarity, it is easy to make the point here. If the initial profitability of
the firm is observable to the entrepreneur but not to outsiders, then any claim issued
by a high quality entrepreneur will suffer a market discount and this is the true cost of
financial markets. If this is sufficiently high then the entrepreneur may still prefer to
delegate control to a manager, who suffers from moral hazard, than issue underpriced
securities. In other words, we effectively handicapped delegation as a potential solution
to E’s problem when we added managerial moral hazard to the problem, while we
assumed perfect information about the quality of the firm. But a fair comparison
between delegation and the use of financial markets requires to consider the information
problems on both sides17.
From the above discussion, we conclude that delegation is an optimal way to solve
the time-consistency problem of the entrepreneur (or, at least, a subset of entrepreneurs)
if the managerial moral hazard is not severe enough (q is low), if the expected profits
of the firms are high (τ is high), and if financial markets suffer from severe adverse
selection. Therefore, even though the solution we propose is not always an optimal
solution, it remains the only optimal solution under a subset of parameter values.
17The model of section 3 can easily accommodate both sides of the problem. Just let two different
types of firms, one with high profits, τH , and one with low profits, τL, where the type of the firm
is private information to the entrepreneur at the start of the period. Then, for a sufficiently high
enough difference of profits between the two types, type H entrepreneurs find it optimal to hire a
manager and avoid the mispricing of their securities, while type L entrepreneurs prefer the financial
markets. Note that even though one prediction of this extension is the same as in Acemoglu (1998)
(high quality firms hire a manager, low quality firms do not), there is an important difference. In our
model firms do not require external capital and only low quality firms sell securities to the markets,
while in Acemoglu (1998) firms need financial capital for investment and, in equilibrium, all of them
borrow from financial markets. In other words, in Acemoglu (1998), delegation is used as a signaling
device to financial markets, while for us markets is a competing mechanism to delegation and operates
as a commitment device.
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4.3 Participation Constraints
In section 3 we simplified the analysis by omitting the participation constraints of the
manager and the worker. Since both of them have a non-negative utility in equilibrium,
the results of the previous section remain the same if we were to assume that the outside
option for both M and W is equal to zero. Here, we discuss how these results change
with the inclusion of more general participation constraints.
First, let ow and om denote the outside options for the worker and the manager
respectively. Clearly, if the outside option of the worker is less than the efficiency wage
under delegation (w), then the cost of hiring her remains unchanged under both control
structures. Therefore, the preferred control structure also depends on the outside option
of the manager. If om is below the expected value of the optimal managerial contract,
then our results remain unchanged. If om lies above the expected value of the managerial
contract, then the cost of hiring the manager is om. By substituting om for E(y2(pi
e
2))
in (4), we get that separation of ownership and control is optimal iff om ≤ 2Vo∆p −
(1− p)Vd + (1− p)Vl − w.
In the case where ow is equal or above w, but less than Epiw2 (wˆ2), then separation is
optimal iff 2Vo∆p ≥ (1 − p)Vd − (1 − p)Vl + ow + max{om, E(y2(pie2))}. Finally, in the
case where ow exceeds Epiw2 (wˆ2), then there is no benefit from delegation and the only
optimal control structure is the combination of ownership with control.
5 Conclusion
The paper presents a simple model of delegation of corporate control from an en-
trepreneur to a manager. Thus, it provides a theoretical reasoning for the separation
of ownership and control in modern firms. The main reasoning behind the model is
that managers can impose penalties to procrastinating workers more credibly than en-
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trepreneurs, because, by the construction of their contract, they do not care about the
long-run value of the firm as much as its owners. Thus, they provide incentives to
workers to exert high effort and generate firm value.
On the other hand, the introduction of managers in the firm generates agency costs
in the form of appropriation of profits for the provision of private benefits to the top
management. This trade-off between low-tier and higher-tier benefits characterizes the
optimal choice of control structure and provides interesting comparative statics. The
model predictions are consistent with the findings of the empirical literature.
Moreover the model provides an interesting theoretical prediction: short-term con-
tracts may dominate long-term contracts if the principal prefers to induce front-loaded
incentives and the release of control generates agency costs. We provide this result
with a simple model. Nonetheless, we find it interesting and leave its generalization for
future research.
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Appendix
Optimal Wage Contracts
(a) Suppose that E wants to induce W to exert high effort. First, consider the case
when E does not liquidate after delay: Ld = 0. E’s problem is to maximize her expected
return subject to the incentive compatibility constraint of W:
max
w
p(e)
2(τ + Vo)− +∞∫
−∞
w(piw2 , 2)f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2

+(1− p(e))
2τ + Vd − +∞∫
−∞
w(piw2 , 2)f(pi
w
2 |µ2d)dpiw2 −
+∞∫
−∞
w(piw3 , 3)f(pi
w
3 |µ3d)dpiw3

subject to:
p
[
2b+
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw2 , 2))f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2
]
+(1− p)
[
3b+
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw2 , 2))f(pi
w
2 |µ2d)dpiw2 +
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw3 , 3))f(pi
w
3 |µ3d)dpiw3
]
− c ≥
p
[
2b+
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw2 , 2))f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2
]
+(1− p)
[
3b+
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw2 , 2))f(pi
w
2 |µ2d)dpiw2 +
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw3 , 3))f(pi
w
3 |µ3d)dpiw3
]
− c
W’s incentive compatibility condition can be rewritten as:
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw2 , 2))[f(pi
w
2 |µo)− f(piw2 |µ2d)]dpiw2 −
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw3 , 3))f(pi
w
3 |µ3d)dpiw3 ≥
∆c
∆p
+ b
Clearly, the derivative of the Lagrangian for this problem with respect to w3 is
negative, hence the optimal wage at period three is zero: wˆ(piw3 , 3) = 0. With respect
to wˆ2, we have:
∂L
∂w2
= −p(e)f(piw2 |µo)− (1− p(e))f(piw2 |µ2d) + λu′(w2)[f(piw2 |µo)− f(piw2 |τ)] = 0
By recalling that µ2d = τ and by rearranging, we have:
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wˆ(piw2 , 2) = (u
′)−1
[
pf(piw2 |µo) + (1− p)f(piw2 |τ)
λ[f(piw2 |µo)− f(piw2 |τ)]
]
(b) Similarly, for the case when E liquidates after delay (Ld = 1):
max
w
p(e)
2(τ + Vo)− +∞∫
−∞
w(piw2 , 2)f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2
+ (1− p(e))(2τ + Vl)
subject to:
+∞∫
−∞
u(w(piw2 , 2))f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2 ≥ max
{
0,
∆c
∆p
− b
}
By setting the first order derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to w2 equal to
zero and rearranging, we get:
u′(w2) =
p
λ
The right-hand side of the above equation is constant, implying that w2 is a constant.
Hence:
+∞∫
−∞
u(w2)f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2 = max
{
0,
∆c
∆p
− b
}
⇒
w2 = u
−1 [max {0, (∆c/∆p)− b}]
Note that, if b is sufficiently high (b > ∆c/∆p), then E can induce high effort even
when she pays zero wage to the worker and irrespectively of W’s risk aversion.
(c) Finally, we show that the E’s expected payment to W under Ld = 1 is lower
than under Ld = 0. In the latter case, because W’s incentive compatibility is binding
and wˆ3 = 0, we have:
+∞∫
−∞
u(wˆ2)f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2 −
+∞∫
−∞
u(wˆ2)f(pi
w
2 |µ2d)dpiw2 =
∆c
∆p
+ b >
∆c
∆p
− b⇒
+∞∫
−∞
u(wˆ2)f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2 >
∆c
∆p
− b
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Therefore, there exists some payment x > 0, such that:
+∞∫
−∞
u(wˆ2 − x)f(piw2 |µo)dpiw2 =
∆c
∆p
− b
But, this implies that the wage schedule wˆ2−x satisfies W’s incentive compatibility
when Ld = 1. However, as we showed in part (b), above, wˆ2 − x is not optimal in this
case, as it forces W to bear risk. Hence:
w <
+∞∫
−∞
wˆ2f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2 − x <
+∞∫
−∞
wˆ2f(pi
w
2 |µo)dpiw2
The above inequalities prove our claim.
Proof of Proposition 1
First we write the incentive compatibility constraints (i)-(iii) in page 17. We then show
that the optimal managerial contract is always a short-term contract. Finally we solve
for the optimal short-term contract.
Recall that µt = τ + (1 − Ls)Vst + LsVlt is the mean of the random variable pimt
and that piet = pi
m
t − rt(pimt ) − w(piwt , t). Iδ is an indicator function which takes the
value 1 if the contract is long-term and takes the value 0 if the contract is short-term.
umt = yt(pi
m
t − rt(pimt )−w(piwt , t)|δ) + qrt(pimt ) is M’s utility for a given realization of pimt .
The three incentive compatibility conditions for the problem are:
rt(pi
m
t ) = argmax{yt(pimt −rt−w(piwt , t)|δ)+qrt}, ∀pimt ∈ (0,+∞), t ∈ {2, 3} (IC1)
L = 1|s = d ⇔
+∞∫
−∞
um2 f(pi
m
2 |µ2l)dpim2 + Iδ
+∞∫
−∞
um3 f(pi
m
3 |µ3l)dpim3 ≥
+∞∫
−∞
um2 f(pi
m
2 |µ2d)dpim2 + Iδ
+∞∫
−∞
um3 f(pi
m
3 |µ3d)dpim3
where: µ2l = τ + Vl , µ3l = τ , µ2d = τ , µ3d = τ + Vd (IC2)
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L = 0|s = o ⇔
+∞∫
−∞
um2 f(pi
m
2 |µo)dpim2 + Iδ
+∞∫
−∞
um3 f(pi
m
3 |µo)dpim3 ≥
+∞∫
−∞
um2 f(pi
m
2 |µ2l)dpim2 + Iδ
+∞∫
−∞
um3 f(pi
m
3 |µ3l)dpim3
where: µo = τ + Vo , µ2l = τ + Vl , µ3l = τ (IC3)
In order to show that short-term contracts dominate long-term contracts, first we
analyze IC1. By differentiating IC1 with respect to rt, we find that the manager is
indifferent between extracting more rents or reporting the true profits if ∂yt
∂piet
= q. This
means that the managerial contract is an increasing function of reported profits, with
slope at least equal to q in order to prevent the manager from extracting private benefits.
Otherwise, the manager has the incentive to appropriate in the neighborhood of any
realized profit where her contract is non-increasing. By doing so, she does not reduce
her compensation while extracting private benefits for herself. Clearly, the expected
payment is minimized when yt = qpi
e
t .
Consider any long-term contract yL = {y2(pie2|δ = 2), y3(pie3|δ = 2)} which satisfies
IC1-IC3. We have established that y
L is increasing in profits in both periods. Consider
now the short-term contract yS = {y2(pie2|δ = 1) = y2(pie2|δ = 2)}. That is yS offers
the same payment schedule as yL for the first period, after which the manager is fired.
yS offers a lower expected payment to M than yL, since M receives no second period
payment. Therefore, yS strictly increases E’s utility over yL.
Furthermore, yS also satisfies the incentive compatibility conditions. To see this,
first, yS satisfies IC1 for period one by construction. Second, IC3 is also satisfied (when
we set Iδ = 0), because the mean of the random variable pi
m
2 is higher under continuation
(µo = τ +Vo) than under liquidation (µ2l = τ +Vl). Since the managerial contract is an
increasing function of profits (by IC1), the expected payment for the manager is higher
when the mean of pimt is higher. It remains to show that IC2 is also satisfied by y
S. By
substituting the values for µt in IC2 and by rearranging, the constraint writes in the
case of yL as follows:
+∞∫
−∞
um2 [f(pi
m
2 |τ + Vl)− f(pim2 |τ)] dpim2 ≥
+∞∫
−∞
um3 [f(pi
m
3 |τ + Vd)− f(pim3 |τ)] dpim3 (5)
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IC1 implies that r3(pi
m
3 ) = 0. Therefore, since τ + V2 > τ and u
m
2 is an increasing
function of pim2 , the right hand side of (5) is strictly positive. However, because u
m
2 = 0
under a short-term contract, the same constraint writes in the case of yS as:
+∞∫
−∞
um2 [f(pi
m
2 |τ + Vl)− f(pim2 |τ)] dpim2 ≥ 0 (6)
Therefore, if y2(pi
e
2|δ = 2) satisfies (5) then it also satisfies (6) and therefore yS also
satisfies IC2. This means that y
S provides a smaller expected payment to M and it also
strictly relaxes IC2. Hence, any incentive compatible long-term contract is dominated
by a short-term contract. For simplicity, we drop the notation δ and period three
payments for the rest of the proof and we solve for the optimal short-term contract.
By limited liability, y2(pi
e
2) = 0 if pi
e
2 < 0. By IC1, y2(pi
e
2) ≥ qpie2 if pie2 ≥ 0. Consider the
contract with the minimum-expected payment which satisfies IC1 and limited liability:
y2 =
{
0, if pi32 < 0
qpie2, if pi
e
2 ≥ 0
(7)
We show that the above contract satisfies IC2-IC3. In evaluating M’s utility from
the above contract, we take into account that the optimal wage is set to w by E, which
is constant. By substituting the above payments for um2 in (6), IC2 writes as:
q
+∞∫
0
(pim2 − w) [f(pim2 |µ2l)− f(pim2 |µ2d)] dpim2 ≥ 0
Since ∂∂µ
[
+∞∫
0
(pim2 − w)f(pim2 |µ)dpim2
]
> 0 and µ2l = τ + Vl > µ2d = τ , the left hand side of
the above equation is strictly positive and IC2 is satisfied. Similarly for IC3:
q
+∞∫
0
(pim2 − w) [f(pim2 |µo)− f(pim2 |µ2l)] dpim2 ≥ 0
Since µo = τ + Vo > µ2l + τ + Vl, IC3 is satisfied as well. Therefore, the contract in (7)
minimizes the rents paid to M due to IC1 and also satisfies IC2 and IC3. Hence, (7)
provides the optimal managerial contract. 
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Renegotiation under Adverse Selection
Consider the model of section 3 with the extension of subsection 4.1. We examine the
renegotiation issue by assuming that E (the uninformed party) makes renegotiation
offers to M (the informed party). We also assume that once E has delegated control
to M, she can not fire her and take over the firm without M’s consent. That is, since
the managerial contract specifies the duration of the agreement, M can always enforce
it through courts and remain in control of the firm up to t = 2. Therefore, if E wants
to avoid liquidation, she needs to compensate M by paying her a lump-sum transfer or
renegotiating the original contract, so that M receives at least the continuation utility
of the previous contract.
After t = 1, M has two sources of private information, which E does not know:
whether the project is delayed or not and the project’s type (high: H or low: L).
However, if the project is to be completed on-time, E has no incentive to renegotiate,
as she can not improve on the outcome (she would take the same liquidation decision
as M and she still needs to compensate M from leaving the firm). Therefore, E wants
to renegotiate with types Hd and Ld but not with types Ho and Lo.
Let Ejs(y) be the expected value of contract y for type js, where j ∈ {H,L} and
s ∈ {o, d}. Also, let {yˆH , yˆL} be the menu of renegotiation contracts that E offers to
M after t = 1 in exchange for M releasing control of the firm. Implicitly, the menu of
contracts is a function of the realized profit level at t = 2: yˆj(pie2). Finally, recall that
y2 is the outside option for M, the original (pre-renegotiation) managerial contract,
as defined in (7). Given the above, we show that a separating equilibrium at the
renegotiation stage does not exist. Such an equilibrium requires the following incentive
compatibility conditions:
EHo(y2) ≥ max{EHo(yˆH), EHo(yˆL)} (8)
EHd(yˆ
H) ≥ max{EHd(yˆL), EHd(y2)} (9)
ELo(y2) ≥ max{ELo(yˆH), ELo(yˆL)} (10)
ELd(yˆ
L) ≥ max{ELd(yˆH), ELd(y2)} (11)
Examining only contracts yˆH , yˆL, inequalities (9) and (11) can be rewritten as:
33
+∞∫
0
[yˆH(pie2)− yˆL(pie2)]f(pie2|τ)dpie2 ≥ 0 and
−
+∞∫
0
[yˆH(pie2)− yˆL(pie2)]f(pie2|τ)dpie2 ≥ 0
In the above inequalities we have used the fact that, if both types accept their
respective contracts and renegotiate, then E takes over the firm, does not liquidate
and therefore the expected mean profit at period t = 2 is equal to τ . Clearly, both
inequalities hold at the same time if and only if yˆH = yˆL, which implies a pooling
contract yˆ for types Hd and Ld. Also, since EHd(y2) > ELd(y2), Hd’s participation
constraint is binding and hence EHd(yˆ) = EHd(y2), which implies that E makes the
same expected payment to both types in order for them to accept renegotiation. That
is, in order to convince Hd to renegotiate, E must make the same payment to Ld.
Now, even if we ignore the remaining constraints from the analysis (which makes it
easier for renegotiation to be valuable to E), we show that E may choose not to renegoti-
ate the contract with M due to the additional costs of adverse selection. This is because,
if she chooses to renegotiate, then she makes the payment EHd(y2) (conditional on types
Ho and Lo rejecting the payment) in order to gain the average project continuation
value φ[V Hd −V Hl ]+(1−φ)[V Ld −V Ll ]. However, if E chooses not to renegotiate then she
expects to pay M a smaller amount, conditional on state d: φEHd(y2) + (1−φ)ELd(y2).
Therefore, a necessary condition for renegotiation is:
EHd[y2]− ELd[y2] ≤ φ
1− φ(V
H
d − V Hl ) + (V Hd − V Ll )
Clearly, the above condition may fail if the difference between V Hl and V
L
l is very
high or if V jd −V jl is very low for both types. Therefore, under some parameter values, E
does not renegotiate with Hd types due to the high costs of adverse selection. Instead,
E makes the payment ELd(y2), which only Ld types accept and renegotiates with them.
In this case, the wage contract w(φ) = u−1[max{∆c/∆p− b(2φ− 1)}] still motivates W
to exert high-effort (although not the optimal one) and therefore, as long as φ is not
too low, separation of ownership and control remains optimal despite the presence of
renegotiation.
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